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RENO v. ACLU:* CHAMPION OF FREE SPEECH




The Internet,' in its currently unregulated state, is an electronic
Wild West-the new cyberfrontier-where netizens should beware
of the dangers encountered on their cybertravels. Some argue that
the clearest danger in this electronic frontier is a child's access to
hardcore pornography.2  Websites with explicit pornographic
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1999; B.A., University of Alberta. The
author wishes to thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Law and Policy, and
Professor Michael Madow for his helpful comments of an early draft of this
Comment, and for having suggested its title. Finally, a special thank you to
Gianna Corbisiero for having put up with this law student these past three years.
See Ian C. Ballon, Intellectual Property Protection and Related Third Party
Liability, 482 PLI/PAT 559, 565 (1997) ("the Internet connects over four million
individual 'servers,' or host computers, around the world. Each server is linked
to and accessible from any other point on the Internet over a matrix of more than
40,000 interconnectednetworks."); Lisa 0. Laky & Thomas H. Watkins, Internet
Issues For Lawyers, 507 PLI/PAT 827, 830 (1998) (stating broadly that "[tihe
Internet, also called the world wide web, is a collection of computers connected
by telephone lines"). See also infra Part III.A, discussing the Supreme Court's
version of the history of the Internet as gleaned from the district court's opinion
in ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-849 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
2 See Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhigh-
way: A Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations
Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty
Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1853 (1995) (citing a
1994 study at Carnegie Mellon University, covering a period of four months
during which all available pornographic material from five popular Electronic
Bulletin Boards was downloaded and discovered to comprise over one million
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material are therefore the high-tech equivalents of the brothels in
frontier towns.
Congress is fully aware that the Internet is a medium ripe for
content regulation,3 and provisions of the Communications
Decency Act4 ("CDA") have sought specifically to target individu-
als who receive and disseminate cyberporn. Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has designated the protection of children
from pornography as a compelling governmental interest.6 None-
theless, the Supreme Court in Reno v ACLU7 struck down
provisions of the CDA which sought to regulate pornographic
files that had been downloaded over eight million times). Mr. Rimm points out
that pornographers have always been the first to exploit the commercial potential
of new technologies-from the advent of the printing press, to VCRs, and now
on the Internet. Id. at 1909. But see Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the
Pornographers: Cybersexual Possibilities, 83 GEO. L.J. 1969, 1974 (1995)
(advocating that the Internet is an ideal medium for young people to engage in
a discourse on sexuality and pornography).
3 See Daniel Pearl, On-Line: Government Tackles a Surge of Smut on the
Internet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at B I (stating that the general response of
both Congress and the White House to the ubiquitous nature of pornography on
the Internet has been to call for regulation).
4 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d), (f) (1996).
See infra Part II.B, analyzing the statutory language criminalizing the
knowing dissemination of all indecent and obscene material over the Internet to
individuals under eighteen years of age.
6 Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (stating that
"there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of
literature that is not obscene by adult standards."); see also New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (stating that "we have sustained legislation aimed at
protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws
have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights"); FCC v.
PacificaFound., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (upholding an FCC regulation limiting
the hours of broadcast of an indecent comic monologue because it advanced the
government's interest in the "well-being of its youth"). Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has held that the state can prohibit the distribution of sexually explicit
material to children, even though the material could be distributed to adults.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (noting that the "well-being
of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate, . . . [including] the availability of sex materials to minors").
' 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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material on the Internet.8 The day after the Reno decision, the Wall
Street Journal, quoting a free speech advocate, proclaimed that "the
Supreme Court has written the First Amendment for the 21st
century."9 This Comment argues that Reno is not the manifesto on
Internet free speech that commentators have suggested. Instead, the
Reno decision presents Congress with the framework to draft new
legislation which, if upheld, will result in significant constraints on
the freedom to disseminate material on the Internet. In fact, this
new legislation may censor material currently protected by the First
Amendment.' 0
The Reno decision is premised on two competing governmental
interests: protecting children from the harmful effects of exposure
to sexually explicit material," and ensuring adult access to
protected material under the First Amendment. 12 However, to
8 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d), (f). Though the question of what content Congress
intended to regulate was at issue in both the lower court opinion and in Justice
Stevens' majority opinion in Reno, the government argued that the statute's scope
was limited to content providers of commercial pornography. See ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 854 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); see
also Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, The State of the
Technology, and the Need for Congressional Action, Hearing on S. 892 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 7-8 (1995).
' Edward Felsenthal & Jared Sandberg, High Court Strikes Down Internet
Smut Law, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1997, at BI (quoting Jerry Berman, the
executive director of the Center for Democracy and Technology). The
International Herald Tribune added that "the line drawn by the court protecting
adults' access to information would appear to make a new approach to Internet
policing technically difficult." Brian Knowlton, Justices Void Internet Indecency
Law: Curb Violates Free Speech, Supreme Court Rules, 7-2, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., June 27, 1997, at 1. See also 143 CONG. REC. S6557-02 (1997) (statement
of Sen. Feingold) (stating "Mr. President, this decision is a victory not only for
Internet users, it is a victory for all Americans who hold the first amendment
right to free speech among their most cherished rights").
'0 See infra Part IV, discussing the newly enacted Child Online Protection
Act which prohibits the dissemination of material on the Internet on the basis
that it is harmful to minors, whether or not adults may have a First Amendment
right to access this material.
" See supra note 6 (noting the compelling state interest in preserving the
emotional and psychological health of children).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech."). See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
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understand the Supreme Court's reasoning in Reno, it is necessary
to distinguish between speech that currently enjoys First Amend-
ment protection13 and speech that is not afforded constitutional
protection.14 Part I illustrates this distinction with a survey of First
Amendment law in the area of obscene and indecent speech. This
survey discusses the regulation of speech that is not protected by
the First Amendment by analyzing the legal standard of obscenity
articulated in Miller v. California.5 Additionally, Part I discusses
Supreme Court decisions that have defined constitutionally
protected indecent speech. This juxtaposition will demonstrate the
absence of a bright line distinction between protected and unpro-
tected speech, and thus the inherent difficulty of imposing these
standards on the Internet. Finally, Part I examines the Supreme
Court's attempt to balance the government's interest in regulating
indecent speech with an adult's First Amendment right of unob-
structed access to this speech.
Part II of this Comment reviews the legislative history of the
CDA and analyzes those sections of the CDA that the Supreme
Court found unconstitutional.'6 Part III discusses the Supreme
Court's analysis in Reno, including a review of the procedural
posture of the case from the district court to the Supreme Court.
This discussion of the Reno opinion addresses the Supreme Court's
characterization of the Internet, 17 the presentation of the
125 (1989) (quoting Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976))
(stating that "[t]he government may serve this legitimate interest [of protecting
children], but to withstand constitutional scrutiny, 'it must do so by narrowly
drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily
interfering with First Amendment freedoms'); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383-84 (1957) (striking down a city ordinance which banned the sale of
pornographic material on the basis that, although the material was unsuitable for
children [seventeen and under], an adult's access to it should not be restricted).
"3 See infra Part I.B, discussing indecent speech which, though unsuitable for
minors, is lawfully accessible to adults.
" See infra Part I.A, discussing obscene speech that is not protected by the
First Amendment.
15 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (providing a three-part test for defining obscenity).
16 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347 (striking down 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) as
unconstitutional).
17 See infra Part III.A.
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government's argument,t8 and the Supreme Court's reasoning for
striking down the amendments to the CDA."9
Part IV argues that Reno effectively invites Congress to draft
legislation more narrowly tailored to a state's interest in protecting
children from exposure to pornography on the Internet. In support
of this proposition, this Comment discusses two bills considered by
Congress in the aftermath of Reno that led to the recent enactment
of the Child Online Protection Act.2" This new statute amends the
Internet provisions of the CDA yet again, and serves as definitive
proof that Reno, the presumed champion of free speech on the
Internet, opens rather than closes the door to regulation on the
Internet. Moreover, this Comment asserts that the Supreme Court's
application of strict scrutiny, as articulated by Justice Stevens in
Reno,2" would not be fatal to a new and improved CDA.22 Sub-
stantial regulation of the Internet is imminent and, in addition to
censoring obscene speech that is not afforded constitutional
protection, could arguably censor speech currently protected by the
First Amendment.
I. SPEECH CURRENTLY PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The present legal standards of obscenity have evolved dramati-
cally over the past few decades. 23 This area of First Amendment
'8 See infra Part III.B.
'9 See infra Part III.C.
20 The first bill, S1482, 105 Cong. (1997), was proposed by Senator Coates.
The second bill, H.R. 3783, 105 Cong. (1998), was proposed by Senator Oxley,
and was enacted into law as the Child Online Protection Act.
2' Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. Justice Stevens articulated the Court's strict
scrutiny analysis by stating that "[the] burden on adult speech is unacceptable if
less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve." Id.
22 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and
Transcending Balance, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 141, 142 (stating that "[t]he strict
scrutiny framework that [Reno] applies ultimately underprotects speech").
23 A number of scholars have documented the evolution of obscenity
standards within First Amendment law in recent years. See, e.g., FREDERICK
SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY; Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution:
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law has proven problematic and the Supreme Court has struggled
to distinguish indecent speech which is afforded constitutional
protection from obscene speech which receives no such protection.
A. Obscene Speech: Outside the First Amendment
In Miller v California, the Supreme Court provided a three-part
test to define obscene speech that remains a pivotal decision in the
evolution of obscenity law.24 The Miller three-part test considers
The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963); Harry Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (discussing, inter
alia, the evils against which obscenity legislation historically has been directed).
This Comment's discussion of the legal standard of obscenity is by no means
exhaustive and is intended only to touch key doctrinal elements.
24 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973) (affirming a conviction for mailing unsolicited
sexually explicit material in violation of a California statute which made it a
misdemeanor to knowingly distribute obscene material). Well into the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court applied the obscenity standard of a nineteenth
century English case, Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868). The standard
used in Hicklin in defining obscene speech was "whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences." 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 361. The most glaring problem
with this standard was its emphasis on the effect of the obscene material on a
person susceptible to its influence rather than the effect on a reasonable person.
Id. Furthermore, the material under scrutiny was not judged as a whole, only the
part with a tendency to corrupt. Id. In Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court
rejected the Hicklin test on the basis that if a work was to be judged simply on
the effect of isolated passages on the most susceptible of individuals, certain
works would be suppressed which, when viewed as a whole, should be given
First Amendment protection. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). In Roth, the defendant
was convicted under a federal statute that prohibited the distribution of obscene
material. Id. at 480. The defendant, quoting the famous words of Justice Holmes,
argued that the First Amendment protected all speech except that which presented
a "clear and present danger" to society. Id. at 486 (quoting Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). The defendant contended that the clear and
present danger test applied to political speech that incited violence, but that
obscene speech elicited no such violent reaction. Id. at 485-86. Rather than
address the issue of how obscenity might pose a danger to society, the Court held
that obscenity was not within the scope of constitutionally protected speech. Id.
at 485. The holding also conveniently allowed the Court to avoid applying a
constitutional test designed for political speech in the area of obscenity law. id.
at 484. The Court found that the speech at issue in Roth was "of such slight
214
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whether the dominant appeal of the obscene matter25 as a whole
is to the "prurient interest" based on a community standard;
whether the work depicts sexual conduct in a "patently offensive"
way; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value., 26 Using this test, the
Supreme Court, citing United States v Roth, 7 reaffirmed the
proposition that obscene speech is not afforded First Amendment
protection.28
The Miller test is problematic, however, because the adoption
of the community standard allows each state to create its own
definition of obscenity consistent with the mores of that communi-
ty. This approach creates the potential for inconsistent judicial
outcomes as a result of varying community standards.2 9 The
danger of inconsistent outcomes is potentially more acute on the
Internet because the individual sending information cannot control
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived . . . is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id. at 484-85 (quoting
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). Further, the Court
defined obscenity as material that dealt with sex in a way that appealed to
"prurient interest." 1d. at 487.
Conspicuously absent from Justice Brennan's analysis in Roth was a
discussion of how obscenity effectively threatened the social order. Id. at 484
(stating that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance" without articulating
how obscenity effectively posed a threat to society). Justice Brennan may have
been hinting that dissemination of pornographic material led to moral decay, or
that a causal link existed between obscene material and anti-social behavior.
There is little support in the Roth opinion, however, for the proposition that
obscenity was socially harmful.
25 The California statute at issue in Miller, Cal. Penal Code § 311 (b),
defined matter as "any book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed or written
material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial
representation." 413 U.S. at 16.
26 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
" 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that "obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press"). See supra note 24 (discussing the
holding in Roth).
28 Miller, 413 U.S. at 28.
29 See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 74 (1996) (husband and wife residing in California convicted by a Tennessee
jury of transporting obscene images via the Internet).
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the jurisdiction in which the material will be received.3 ° This
situation may arise when an individual disseminating pornographic
material on the Internet is not committing a criminal act in his
state, provided that the community standards in that state are
relatively liberal, yet is simultaneously committing a criminal act
in a sister state with a more conservative obscenity standard, where
the material was downloaded.3'
A recent decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, United States v Thomas,32 clearly illustrates the
problem of inconsistent definitions of community standards of
obscenity. In Thomas, a husband and wife residing in California
operated the "Amateur Action Computer Bulletin Board," which
contained sexually explicit photographs.3 3 The couple was convict-
ed by a Tennessee jury of transporting obscene computer generated
material in interstate commerce, after a Tennessee resident
downloaded these materials on his home computer.34 The
Thomases were each sentenced to over two and a half years in
prison.35 The convictions were affirmed by the Sixth Circuit on
the grounds that the more conservative Tennessee community
standard was applicable because a Tennessee citizen downloaded
the material which led to the conviction.36 The circuit court
30 See, e.g., Erik G. Swenson, Redefining Community Standards in Light of
the Geographic Limitlessness of the Internet.- A Critique of United States v.
Thomas, 82 MINN. L. REV. 855, 859 (1998). Swenson states:
One of the fastest growing areas on the Internet involves newsgroups
and bulletin boards specializing in pornography . . . . Internet users
from around the world can post pornographic material to bulletin
boards, while other users can view and selectively download this
material instantaneously without the bulletin board operator knowing
who is accessing the board or where the user is located. Indeed, even
if they wanted to, bulletin board operators could not selectively block
out users from accessing the bulletin boards.
Id. at 860 (footnotes omitted).
3' Id. at 874-75.
32 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
33 Id. at 705.
34 Id. at 705-06.
31 Id. at 706.
36 Id. at 710-711.
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reasoned that as a result of this single citizen's access, the entire
Tennessee community was potentially affected by the pornographic
material. 37 The Court affirmed the conviction, even though the
Thomases arguably would not have been convicted under the more
liberal community standard in California.38
B. Indecent Speech: Inside the First Amendment
In United States v Roth, the Supreme Court made clear that
obscene speech is afforded no constitutional protection. 39 Howev-
er, although the Miller three-part test attempts to provide a
narrower definition of obscenity,4" there still exists a class of
speech that is near obscene, yet is nonetheless given protection
under the First Amendment. 4' This indecent speech, as defined by
the Supreme Court, encompasses more speech than obscenity.
42
Indecent speech, unlike obscenity, has been characterized by
Supreme Court as not totally devoid of "social, literary, artistic,
political or scientific value., 43 The elusiveness of a precise
37 Id.
31 Id. See also Swenson, supra note 30, at 873 (arguing that the Thomas
court erred in concluding that the more strict Tennessee standard was applicable
to the defendants who were California residents because the Thomases had "the
means to limit access in jurisdictions where obscenity standards were lower than
in California").
3' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (holding that a federal
obscenity statute "did not offend constitutional safeguards"). See supra note 24
(discussing the Roth holding).
40 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. See supra Part I.A, discussing the Miller three-part
test for obscenity.
41 See supra note 6 (noting that indecent material may be harmful to minors
but appropriate for adults).
42 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (holding that indecent
speech is "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality") (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
41 Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 (stating that "[a]t a minimum, prurient, patently
offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection").
Moreover, Justice Powell in Pacifica stated that "I do not subscribe to the theory
that Justices of this Court are free generally to decide ... which speech protected
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definition of indecent speech has hindered the resolution of the
clash between the First Amendment right of an adult to access
indecent material and the compelling governmental interest of
shielding children from this material."
Justice Stevens' opinion in FCC v Pacifica Foundation
45
defined indecent speech as a category of speech that might, or
might not, be protected by the First Amendment depending on its
context. 46 The Pacifica Court accepted the FCC's definition of
indecency as material "that describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards ... sexual or
excretory activities and organs at times of the day when there is a
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience., 47 Based on
Pacifica, indecency is therefore inextricably linked to its context.48
Material that would be considered indecent if it were broadcast
over the radio in mid-afternoon, when children could easily gain
access to it, 49 would not be indecent if broadcast late at night,
by the First Amendment is most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most
protection, and which is less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection."
438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring).
4" See Volokh, supra note 22, at 167. Professor Volokh articulates the
conflict in the following way:
In most free speech controversies the question is about trade-offs. How
much free speech should we be willing to sacrifice in order to shield
children, or to achieve any other government interest? Conversely, how
much shielding of children-or how much of any other important
value-must we sacrifice in order to protect free speech? Behind every
framework- for scrutiny of speech regulations lurks a judgment about
the trade-offs that must be paid.
Id.
4' 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
46 Id. at 747-48.
47 Id. at 732.
41 Id. at 748. Justice Stevens illustrated this point when he stated the simple
axiom that "[w]ords that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in
another." Id. at 747.
41 Id. The major concern for Justice Stevens in Pacifica was that the speech
in question, a monologue by the comedian George Carlin, was broadcast in the
middle of the day when any child could listen. Id. at 750. The relative ease with
which a child could access the indecent material was central to Justice Stevens'
willingness to allow the FCC regulation. Id.
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when the likelihood of exposure to children is greatly
diminished. 0 However, even with the contextual approach to
indecency, as enunciated in Pacifica, the potential for regulatory
encroachment of protected speech exists because the government
must continually balance the competing interests of child protection
and First Amendment protection.
C. Suppression of Protected Speech and the Government's
Regulatory Interest
To justify regulation of indecent speech, federal and state
governments have traditionally voiced the compelling interests of
protecting children from the harmful effects of indecent material,
and supporting parents in their efforts to protect children from
exposure to this material.5" The Supreme Court has generally
rejected these interests if the result has been to prohibit adult access
to indecent material.5 2
In Butler v Michigan, for example, the Supreme Court struck
down a Michigan ordinance banning the sale of pornographic
material which was "found to have a potentially deleterious
influence on youth. 5 3 The Supreme Court ruled that the effect of
the ordinance was to "reduce the adult population of Michigan to
reading only what is fit for children., 54 The Butler Court held that
legislation effectively prohibiting access to adults was per se
unconstitutional irrespective of the governmental interest assert-
ed.55
50 id.
51 See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recogniz-
ing the "compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors"); Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (stating that
"parents ... who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are
entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibili-
ty").
52 See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
53 id.
" Id. (stating that the result of the ordinance "is to bum the house to roast
the pig").
" Id. (holding that a law is unconstitutional if the "legislation [is] not
reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal").
219
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
Though a complete ban on indecent speech is unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court has on several occasions upheld laws regulating
indecent material.56 For example, in Young v American Mini
Theatres, Inc.,7 the Supreme Court upheld an adult theater zoning
ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance only regulated
locations where adult films could be shown, and did not ban films
entirely.18 The Court reasoned that the ordinance was not content-
based59 and should not be subjected to strict scrutiny 6° The
government argued in Reno that the CDA was essentially a zoning
regulation for the Internet and should be upheld just as in
Young-an argument that the Supreme Court found unavailing.
In Sable Communications v. FCC,6 1 the Court examined the
potential conflict between the government's compelling interest in
protecting children from harm due to exposure to indecent material
and the First Amendment protection that is afforded this materi-
al. 62 The Sable Court struck down a predecessor of the CDA
which banned indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial
telephone messages.63 Specifically in Sable, the effect of the
16 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (upholding an FCC
regulation limiting the hours of broadcast of an indecent comic monologue);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968) (upholding a New York statute
prohibiting the sale to minors of "girlie" magazines).
" Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 58 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Detroit ordinance which sought to regulate in which areas
of the city, and at what proximity to each other, adult theaters and adult
bookstores could be situated).
58 Young, 427 U.S. at 71.
9 Id. Content-based legislation has the effect of regulating a class of speech
that otherwise would be afforded First Amendment protection, based on the
content of that speech. Id. Content-based regulation is subject to strict scrutiny
and is presumed to be constitutionally suspect. Id. In Justice Stevens' opinion,
the ordinance was not content based and thus not subject to strict scrutiny. Id. Cf
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1969) (maintaining only an
intermediate level of scrutiny when a regulation was "unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression").
6 Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
6' 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
62 Id. at 126.
63 Id. at 115 (striking down 47 U.S.C. § 223(b), amending the
Communications Act of 1934).
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Federal statute was to ban sexually explicit "Dial-a-Porn"
64
messages that telephone callers could dial into and receive.65
Though the Court recognized the compelling interest of shielding
children from these messages,66 it also recognized that exposure
to children was greatly diminished by the active steps necessary to
gain access to the pornographic messages.67 The Court therefore
determined that constitutionally protected speech could be regulated
to promote a compelling governmental interest if no less restrictive
means existed. 68 Unlike the scenario in Pacifica, where an inno-
cent child need only turn on a radio to hear the indecent speech,
"Dial-a-Porn" access required a willing audience to take active
steps by dialing into the message service.69 What appeared
determinative in the Sable Court's decision to strike down the
federal statute was the Government's inability to adequately
demonstrate that children were actually harmed by "Dial-a-Porn"
messages v.7 The Supreme Court concluded that "the Government
may serve this legitimate interest [of protecting the psychological
well being of children], but to withstand constitutional scrutiny, 'it
must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those
interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment
freedoms. ",
7 1
64 Id. at 117-118 (explaining that "Dial-a-Pom" is a commercial service that
offers sexually oriented prerecorded telephone messages from special telephone
lines that can accommodate high volume calls).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Sable, 492 U.S. at 128.
68 Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 129-30. The Sable Court noted:
There is no doubt that Congress enacted a total ban on both obscene
and indecent telephone communications. But aside from conclusory
statements during the debates by proponents of the bill ... the
congressional record presented to us contains no evidence as to how
effective or ineffective the FCC's most recent regulations were or
might prove to be.
Id.
" Id. (citations omitted).
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II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996
In Sable, the Supreme Court grappled with both the constitu-
tional implications of banning indecent material over commercial
telephone lines,72 and the inherent conflict between protecting
children from harmful material and protecting the First Amend-
ment.73 The conflict articulated in Sable reappeared when the
Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996."4
A. Legislative Background
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 7" comprising Title V of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996,76 and amending the
Communications Act of 1934.77 The provisions of the CDA that
were specifically intended to regulate content on the Internet were
approved by the Senate in the summer of 1995.78 These provisions
were referred to as the "Exon-White Amendments" or the "Exon
72 Id. at 115.
71 Id. at 129-130.
74 See infra Part II.B, discussing the Reno Court's analysis of the CDA
provisions under scrutiny.
71 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996). See Tracy Moorefield, Legal Update:
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 3 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 13 (1997)
(discussing the CDA in light of various District Court cases which challenged the
statute, including ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). See also
Elaine M. Spiliopoulos, Legislative Update: The Communications Decency Act
of 1996, 7 J. ART & ENT. L. 336, 347 (1997) (discussing the constitutional
implications of the CDA).
76 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified is scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
" Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
78 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d), (e). Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 347 (stating
that the general scope of the CDA "restricts certain communications over
computer networks by subjecting violators to criminal penalties and fines"). The
provisions at issue in Reno were passed by a vote of 84 to 16. Spiliopoulos,
supra note 75, at 346.
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Decency Act," named after the authors of the amendments.7 9
Senator Exon's statement to the House of Representatives in June
of 1995 expressed the general tenor of the proposed amendments:
"we should properly address ... the matter of trying to clean up
the Internet-or the information superhighway, as it is frequently
called-to make the superhighway a safe place for our children and
our families to travel on."8° From the perspective of Senator
Exon, who drafted some of the language of the statute, the CDA
was intended to cleanse the Internet of speech that arguably had no
First Amendment protection. 8'
Senator Patrick Leahy 82 strongly opposed the Exon amend-
ments and proposed the Child Protection, User Empowerment and
Free Expression in Interactive Media Study Act as a rival amend-
ment to the CDA.83 Senator Leahy's fear was that, rather than
'9 142 CONG. REC. S3146-02 (daily ed. March 28, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Exon) (stating "[i]n my nearly 18 years in the Senate, I have won passage of
many pieces of legislation dealing with the most important issues of the day
including bills affecting national security, law enforcement, transportation, safety
and deficit reduction. No bill that I have worked on has had as much attention,
discussion or debate as the Communications Decency Act"). Senator James Exon,
at the time the CDA was voted into law, was the Democratic Senator from
Nebraska. Senator White is the Republican Senator from Washington State. See
generally, Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet (visited Nov. 29,
1998) <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas2.html>.
'o 141 CONG. REC. S8087 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
"' Id. at S8090. Senator Exon insisted that commercial pornography was the
target of his amendments:
Let me emphasize once again what I am trying to do, Mr. President,
is to stop these [pornographers] over here essentially from using
teasers, not unlike coming attractions that we see when we go to the
movies . . . . What they do is take the best and most enticing pictures
of whatever they want to sell ... and they enter it over here on the
Internet. . . those are the pictures, those are the articles that are freely,
without charge, accessible to the very young children and to anyone
else who wants to see them.
id.
82 Senator Leahy is a Democrat from Vermont. See generally Thomas:
Legislative Information on the Internet (visited Nov. 29, 1998)
<http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas2.html>.
" 141 CONG. REC. S-8395-96 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). Vikas Arora, Note, The Communications Decency Act: Congressional
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deter commercial pornographers and private purveyors of indecent
content, the CDA would "chill free speech and the free flow of
information over the Internet and computer networks., 84 Senator
Leahy's concern about the chilling effect of the CDA would
become a theme of the Supreme Court's analysis in Reno.
B. The CDA Provisions Under Scrutiny
The Supreme Court in Reno focused on three sections of the
CDA.85 These sections were characterized respectively as the
provision to regulate indecent or obscene material on the Internet,
the provision to regulate patently offensive material on the Internet,
and the affirmative defenses that are available to avoid liability. 6
The first provision, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), imposed criminal
sanctions on a person who:
(1) in interstate or foreign communications ... (A) by
means of a communications device knowingly ... (i)
initiates the transmission of, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communications
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of
the communication is under 18 years of age ... (2)
knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
his control to be used for any activity prohibited by
paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such
activity ....87
The second provision, 47 U.S.C. § 223(d), further imposed criminal
sanctions on a person who:
Repudiation of the "Right Stuff" 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 473, 481-82 (1997)
(describing proposed bill requiring a study to be done by the Justice Department
to look into the necessity of legislation to regulate pornography on the Internet
in light of penal laws that prohibited the dissemination of obscene material and
child pornography).
84 141 CONG. REC. S4841-01 (daily ed. March 30, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
85 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338-39 (1997) (ruling on the
constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d), (e)(1996)).
86 Id.
" The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1996).
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(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly...
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a
specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) to display ... any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image ... that, in context, depicts or describes,
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs, regardless of whether the user of such service
placed the call or initiated the communication ....88
Finally, 47 U.S.C. § 223(e) provided that it would be a defense
against prosecution under the statute if a person:
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and
appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or
prevent access by minors to a communication specified in
such subsections, which may involve any appropriate
measures to restrict minors from such communications,
including any method which is feasible under available
technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by
requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult
access code, or adult personal identification number.89
A cursory reading of these provisions exposes the potential
danger of vagueness and overbreadth in the statute.90 For example,
8 Id. § 223(d).
I d. § 223(e).
90 A law is void for overbreadth if it "does not aim specifically at evils
within the allowable area of [the State's] control, but ... sweeps within its ambit
other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise" of
constitutional rights. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (voiding a
statute that prohibited picketing because it banned peaceful picketing protected
by the First Amendment). Professor Lawrence Tribe states that if the prohibited
conduct in the statute spills over into activities that are protected by the First
Amendment, the statute is eligible for invalidation on that ground. LAWRENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-27, 1022 (2d ed. 1988). See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991)
(discussing the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine). See generally Henry P.
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (discussing the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine). In contrast, a law is void for vagueness if it is so vague
that a person "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
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section 223(a) includes both indecent and obscene speech in the
category of material that is banned from the Internet. 91 The result
of this merger creates an overbroad category of speech susceptible
to criminalization, and it also demonstrates Congress' dubious grasp
of current First Amendment law in the area of indecency.9 2 The
failure to distinguish obscene speech, which is afforded no First
Amendment protection, from indecent speech, which is constitu-
tionally protected, creates the risk of censoring protected speech.9
3
Without narrowly defining the type of speech the statute seeks to
suppress, the scope of the statute is overbroad.94 The American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") issued a statement shortly after
Senator Exon's initial proposal stating that even if the protection of
children from indecent material on the Internet was a compelling
government interest, the CDA was not narrowly tailored to meet
that goal.95 Fear of potential liability would therefore chill the
dissemination of protected indecent speech on the Internet, because
rather than risk prosecution under the broad scope of the CDA, an
differ as to its application." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926) (discussing various contexts in which the vagueness doctrine could
appropriately be applied). See TRIBE, supra, § 12-31, at 1033-35.
9 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (criminalizing the transmission of any communication
"which is obscene or indecent").
92 See Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 351 (arguing that Congress made no
attempt in section 223(a) to distinguish between non-obscene speech, which is
protected under the First Amendment, and obscene speech which is not
protected).
" Spiliopoulos supra note 75, at 351 (stating bluntly: "Congress has drafted
an unconstitutionally overbroad statute as construed because it bans constitution-
ally protected speech between adults.").
" Spiliopoulos supra note 75, at 351-52 (stating that the CDA bans
constitutionally protected speech, noting that "[j]ust as there is only a small
percentage of the population on the Internet, only a small percentage of the
material found in cyberspace is pornographic").
" Arora, supra note 83, at 488-90 (quoting ACLU Cyber-Liberties Alert,
Fight Online Censorship! Axe the Exon Bill!, (visited Apr. 24, 1997)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Censorship/Exon bill/aclus314 hr 1004.statement>); see
also Brief for the Appellee at 19-20, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
(No. 96-511) (stating, for example, that "that the CDA is ineffective at achieving
the government's goal because it will not prevent minors from accessing the
'indecent' material posted outside the United States").
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individual would simply refrain from exercising his or her right to
access this speech.96
In addition to its failure to distinguish obscene from indecent
speech, the CDA is replete with vague statutory language.97 Many
of the key terms of the provisions are not defined, including
"obscene," "indecent," and "patently offensive." 98 Nor does the
language of section 223(a) indicate whether sexually explicit
images on the Internet fall within the scope of the statute. 99
Absent a clear definition of what constitutes obscene, as opposed
to indecent, material the transmittor must censor the material
himself to avoid possible criminal sanctions.00 It is precisely this
self-censorship for fear of liability, in light of a constitutionally
vague statute, which has a chilling effect on protected speech.0 1
No less vague is the language of section 223(d) that imposes
criminal sanctions for speech that is "patently offensive as
96 Arora, supra note 83, at 490 (stating that "overbreadthwould chill Internet
users from employing protected, albeit indecent, speech" because of a fear of
prosecution under the CDA).
97 Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 355 (stating that "[t]he problem of
vagueness in the language of the Act deters individuals from freely disseminating
their ideas on the Internet"). See supra note 90 (discussing the vagueness
doctrine).
" Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 355 (asking that "[i]f no definitions exist
for indecent, obscene and patently offensive, then how can we assume that
content providers would be able to accurately distinguish between protected and
unprotected speech?"). See supra note 90 (discussing the vagueness doctrine).
" Spiliopoulos supra note 75, at 353-54 (stating that the chilling effect of
the statute's vagueness would result in the suppression of "life-saving informa-
tion" on the Internet, such as safe-sex information on AIDS Websites, or graphic
content concerning human rights abuses against African women from genital
mutilation).
0 William Bennett Turner, The First Amendment and the Internet, 482
PLI/PAT 33, 45 (1997) (stating that "[t]he problem with the CDA, however, is
that it goes beyond hard core obscene material to make it a felony to communi-
cate merely 'indecent' . . . material. The Court has never before upheld a
criminal statute outlawing speech that is not legally obscene.").
'0' Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 355. See also Meyer, supra note 2, at
1987 (stating that "[a] governmentally imposed requirement to control obscenity
and child pornography online, such as that contained in the Exon bill, would not
only be ineffective but also unconstitutional").
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measured by contemporary community standards.' ', 2 The lan-
guage in this instance is borrowed from the Supreme Court's
analysis of obscenity in Pacifica.'0 3 Using this language, howev-
er, is problematic for several reasons. The medium regulated in
Pacifica was broadcasting, and the Supreme Court was concerned
with the open access to television and radio and the high probabili-
ty of children inadvertently accessing adult material.
10 4
Cyberspace creates a significantly different environment where
access to adult material is rarely inadvertent, and an individual
must take formal steps to reach adult sites.' °5 And although
Congress sought to adopt the present legal standards of indecency,
those standards are no less amorphous and vague when applied to
the Internet.' °6 Furthermore, the community standard used to
establish what material is patently offensive is ill suited to the
ubiquitous nature of the Internet community.
0 7
102 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B) (1996). See supra note 90 (discussing the
vagueness doctrine).
103 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (defining indecency
as material "that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards ... sexual or excretory activities and organs,
at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience"). See supra Part IB, discussing the Pacifica Court's contextual
approach to a definition of indecency.
104 Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 363 ("The steps to find pornography, or
any materials on-line, are much more labor-intensive then simply turning the dial
of a television or flipping the on switch of a radio.").
105 Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 363. One of the Court's concerns in
Pacifica was to protect the "unwilling" participant-the individual who would
inadvertently tune into an indecent broadcast. 438 U.S. at 748-49. The potential
for an unwilling participant on the Internet is far lower given the active steps the
individual must take to gain access, including, for example, logging on to the
Internet and "surfing" to adult sites. Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 363.
106 Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 355 (emphasizing the chilling effect of the
statute's vagueness).
17 Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 356. This point is best illustrated by the
result in United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
74 (1996). See infra Part I.A, discussing the inadequacy of applying the
community standard to the Internet. For an alternative view that the contempo-
rary community standard is appropriately applied to the Internet, see Timothy S.
T. Bass, Comment, Obscenity in Cyberspace: Some Reasons for Retaining the
Local Community Standard, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 471, 480 (arguing that
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Finally, the affirmative defenses laid out in § 223(e) also are
vague and make it difficult for the finder of fact to make determi-
nations.' °8 For example, it is difficult for the fact finder to
determine, and the defendant to prove, that defendant made a "good
faith, reasonable and effective" effort to prevent access to chil-
dren.' 09 Moreover, the term "effective" is a misnomer because if
a defendant's efforts were effective, he would have successfully
prevented access to minors, thereby avoiding any unlawful conduct.
III. RENO V. ACLU: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE
Immediately after President Clinton signed the CDA into
law, 110 several plaintiffs filed suit"' against Attorney General
Janet Reno and the Justice Department challenging the constitution-
ality of two of its provisions: sections 223(a) and (d)."' These
senders of obscene material "are probably aware that receivers in multiple
jurisdictions can download the material" and therefore this affords sufficient
notice to the sender). Id. 480. This reasoning overlooks the fact that the mere
potential for criminal liability in a foreign jurisdiction would chill speech on the
Internet.
108 47 U.S.C. § 223(e) (1996). It is a defense against prosecution if a person:
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under
the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors ... which may involve
any appropriate measures ... feasible under such technology. Id. See also
Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 353-54 (stating that present technology offers no
feasible and reasonable way to restrict access to minors, therefore providers of
obscene material may still be liable).
09 Spiliopoulos, supra note 75, at 350-51.
... See supra Part II.A, discussing the enactment of the CDA.
. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997). Plaintiffs included, among others, the ACLU, Human Rights Watch,
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Journalism Education Association. As a
clever and somewhat ironic method of gaining standing, the ACLU posted on its
website a copy of the Supreme Court opinion in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
which included as an appendix the manuscript of George Carlin's indecent
monologue. Brief for the Appellee at 18, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
(No. 96-511). The ACLU argued that the mere presence of the Pacifica decision
on its website violated the CDA. Id.
112 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 828.
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plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
both provisions." 3 After extensive fact finding," 4 the District
Court granted a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the term
"indecent" in the statute was too vague to impose criminal
liability" 5 A second suit was subsequently filed by another group
of plaintiffs adversely affected by the statute" 6 and both actions
were consolidated." 7 In the consolidated action, Chief Justice
Sloviter, in Pennsylvania District Court, questioned the state's
compelling interest in regulating material on the Internet of such
broad scope." 8 The District Court ruled that the terms "indecent"
and "patently offensive" were too vague to pass constitutional
muster." 9 As a result, reasoned the District Court, "speakers who
display arguably indecent content on the Internet must choose
between silence and the risk of prosecution."' 2 ° According to the
District Court, the chill on protected speech under the First
Amendment was too great a constitutional price to pay. 2' The
District Court, therefore, entered an injunction against the enforce-
ment of section 223(a)(1)(B) to the extent that it related to indecent
speech, and unconditionally enjoined the enforcement of section
223(d)(1) and (2) because the provisions failed to distinguish
obscenity or child pornography from indecent content.1
22
I'3 ld. at 826.
''4 Id. at 830. The district court's findings of fact regarding the history and
nature of the Internet totaled forty-eight paragraphs and were excerpted from the
stipulation of the parties filed with the court. Id.
... Id. at 859-60.
..6 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2339 (1997) (listing over twenty
organizations who filed a second suit, including Apple Computers, Inc. and
CompuServe, Inc.).
117 Id.
... ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 853 (stating "I am far less confident than the
government that its [legal authority] has shown a compelling interest in
regulating the vast range of online material covered or potentially covered by the
CDA").
''9 Id. at 849.
120 id.
121 id.
122 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2340. Child pornography, like obscenity, is given no
constitutional protection. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 752 (1982) (holding
that films of boys masturbating, though not obscene according to the Ferber
230
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Subsequently, the government appealed to the Supreme Court under
the CDA's special review provisions.'23
A. The Court's History of the Internet
What is immediately striking about the Reno opinion is the
detailed discussion of the history and nature of the Internet which
the Supreme Court inherited from the district court findings.2 4
These findings concerning the Internet were stipulated by the
parties in the district court action.125 The Reno Court's first
observation concerned the "extraordinary growth" of the Internet
since its original application to military communications in the late
1960's.126 The Supreme Court noted that at the time of trial there
were forty million Internet users, 127 and the number of users was
expected to grow to over two hundred million by 1999.128 The
Internet was characterized not only in terms of tremendous growth
Court, are not constitutionally protected speech).
123 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (citing special review provisions of the
CDA, Pub. L. 104-104, § 561, 110 Stat. 142-143 (1996)).
124 Of the sixty-three pages that comprise the majority opinion, the initial
sixteen pages are devoted to a discussion of the Internet. Id. at 2334.
125 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 830. The district court excerpted one hundred and
twenty-three paragraphs of the two hundred and eighty-six stipulated paragraphs
by the parties on the history of the Internet. Id. at 830-849. In light of the
comprehensive nature of the stipulation, the district court's findings will likely
play a role in future Internet cases.
126 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334. Originally, the military program called
ARPANET (Advanced Research Project Agency-NET) was used by a network
of military defense contractors and universities doing defense-related research.
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
127 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
121 Id. See also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831 (1996) The district court in its
findings of fact noted:
In 1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to the
Internet, and by 1989, the number stood at fewer than 90,000
computers. By 1993, over 1,000,000 computers were linked.
Today, over 9,400,000 host computers worldwide, of which
approximately 60 percent located within the United States,
are estimated to be linked to the Internet.
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in users but also by the myriad ways information could be
retrieved: including electronic mail 29 (e-mail), mail explod-
ers, 130 newsgroups,13 1 chat rooms 132 (which allow individuals
to enter a discreet area of a site from different computers and
enables them to simultaneously write to each other in conversation-
al style), and the best known of retrieval systems, the World Wide
Web. 1
33
The Court effectively illustrated the simplicity of navigating on
the internet and the plethora of information that an individual can
access. 34 Included in this cyberspace was sexually explicit
information that could be accessed either intentionally or inadver-
tently during the course of an imprecise search.' Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, clearly indicated that sexually
explicit content on the internet was ubiquitous and "extend[ed]
from the modestly titillating to the hardest core.' 36 The charac-
terization of the Internet as a technology boom with limitless
129 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335. See also Brief for the Appellee at 11, Reno v.
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-511).
30 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335 (explaining that mail exploders are servers that
automatically send information to mailing lists).
131 Id. (stating that newsgroups are servers that post over one hundred
thousand messages daily).
132 Id. (allowing individuals to enter a site from different computers and
enabling them to write to each other, simultaneously, in conversational style).
133 Id. at 2335-36.
134 Id. Justice Stevens stated:
Navigating the [World Wide] Web is relatively straightforward. The
user may either type the address of a known page or enter one or more
keywords into a commercial 'search engine' in an effort to locate sites
on a subject of interest. A particular Web page may contain the
information sought by the 'surfer,' or, through its links, it may be an
avenue to other documents located anywhere on the Internet. . . . The
Web is thus comparable, from the reader's viewpoint, to both a vast
library including millions of readily available and indexed publications
and a sprawling mall offering goods and services.
Id.
"' Id. at 2336.
136 Id. at 2335.
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possibilities for the free dissemination of all imaginable
content 137-including sexually explicit material-suggests that the
government's interest in protecting children from this content
justified regulation of the Internet. 38 With this government
interest in mind, the Reno Court explored the means presently
available to shield material deemed harmful to children. 39 For
example, Age Verification Software was viewed by the Court as an
ineffective means of determining a user's age, and therefore, it
could not guarantee that only adults could access adult sites. 140
Furthermore, the requirement of a credit card would be prohibitive
both to some adult users, who genuinely wanted to access adult
cites, and to non-commercial web pages that contained indecent
material. 14' The Supreme Court also discussed the effectiveness
of Parental Control Software, 42 which a user could download
onto a home computer and use to avoid any site containing sexual
expletives. 43 The problem with this software was that it only
' d. Justice Stevens, quoting from the district court opinion, emphasized
that "it is 'no exaggeration to conclude that the content on the Internet is as
diverse as human thought."' Id. (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842).
138 Brief for the Appellant at 19, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
(No. 96-511) (arguing that regulation of the Internet was appropriate because
"Congress sought to make the Internet a resource that all Americans could use
without fear that their children would be exposed to the harmful effects of
indecent material").
'9 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2338.
40 Id. The Supreme Court in Reno described parental software in the
following way: "A system may either limit a computer's access to an approved
list of sources that have been identified as containing no adult material, it may
block designated inappropriate sites, or it may attempt to block messages
containing identifiable objectionable features." Id.
'4' Id. at 2336. Justice Stevens appeared to agree with Appellees' argument
that non-commercial web pages could not necessarily afford to pay the service
charges associated with credit card use. Id. In any event, the government was
unable to demonstrate, according to Justice Stevens, that credit card verification
could ensure that the credit card user was over eighteen years-old. Id.
142 Id. at 2335. The district court identified several proprietary versions of
"parental control software," which is software designed to allow a parent to
control what Internet content can be accessed from the home computer. See
ALCU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 839-842 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct.
2329 (1997).
143 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2325.
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detected obscene words and could not detect sites that contained
only images.144 The Court appeared satisfied, nonetheless, with
the government's evidence that a "reasonably effective" parental
control software would be available soon.
45
B. The Supreme Court Rejects the Government's Arguments
Aware of the potential exposure to children of pornographic
material, in light of its consideration of the Internet's history and
technology, the Supreme Court assessed the government's argument
in Reno that the CDA was constitutional. 46 The government
relied on three cases to support its contention that the CDA did not
infringe First Amendment rights: Ginsberg v New York,147 FCC
v Pacifica Foundation,48 and Renton v Playtime Theaters.
149
The Supreme Court ruled that none of these cases was applicable
to the CDA. 50
1. Ginsberg v. New York
In Ginsberg, the defendant was convicted for selling "girlie"
magazines-which the state admitted were not obscene for
adults-to a sixteen year-old boy. 5' This sale was a violation of
a New York statute prohibiting the sale to minors under seventeen
years of age of material defined as harmful to minors.'52 The
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2341-44.
147 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
14' 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
149 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
15' Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341 (stating that "[a] close look at these cases,
however, raises-rather than relieves-doubts concerning the constitutionality of
the CDA").
' Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631 (stating that defendant allegedly "sold a 16-
year-old boy two 'girlie' magazines on each of two dates in October 1965").
'5' Id. at 633. Section 484-h of the N.Y. Penal Law as enacted by L. 1965,
ch. 327, provided in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly to sell or loan for monetary consideration to a minor: (a) any picture,
photograph ... or image of a person or portion of the human body which depicts
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Supreme Court in Ginsberg held that the statute was constitutional
on the grounds, inter alia, that it prevented children from obtaining
indecent material without limiting an adult's First Amendment right
to access this material. 15 3 The Reno opinion distinguished the
holding in Ginsberg based on several factors. First, the majority
opinion ruled that the statute in Ginsberg was far narrower in scope
than the CDA. 5 4 For example, Justice Stevens noted that the
New York statute applied solely to commercial transactions, while
the CDA was not so limited.155 Second, the New York statute
defined material harmful to minors as "utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors."'' 56 According to Justice Stevens,
the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg was constitutional
because it narrowly targeted commercial speech deemed harmful to
minors and distinguished it from speech that might have some
value to adults. 57 The absence of a precise definition of "inde-
cent" in section 223(a) of the CDA, and the CDA's blanket
prohibition of all such material on the Internet, is what ultimately
set it apart from the New York statute in Ginsberg.158 The CDA
made no attempt to distinguish between its prohibition of "obscene"
material, afforded no First Amendment protection, and "indecent"
material, which, although harmful to minors, is given First Amend-
ment protection. 159
2. FCC v Pacifica Foundation
In Pacifica, the Supreme Court upheld an order of the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") that advised imposing
sanctions on the Pacifica Foundation for the afternoon radio
PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965)).
"' Id. at 643.
114 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
'55 Id. The New York statute criminalized the "transmission of, any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communications which
is obscene or indecent." Id. (emphasis added).
56 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646.
Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
158 Id.
9 Id. at 2344.
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broadcast of a monologue entitled "Filthy Words" by the comedian
George Carlin. 160 Justice Stevens, writing for the Reno majority,
distinguished the holding in Pacifica on the grounds that the FCC
order sought to regulate the time of day of the broadcast and not
its content. 161 Consequently, access to the indecent material was
not completely prohibited. It was simply regulated at times of the
day when the material would be harmful to children. The CDA, by
contrast, was a content-based statute, completely prohibiting access
to indecent material.162 Justice Stevens added that radio broad-
casting, the medium at issue in Pacifica, was accessed by children
with relative ease and, thus, a compelling interest existed to avoid
inadvertent contact by children with indecent material. 63 In
contrast, pornographic sites on the Internet, the Court reasoned,
were all preceded by a warning page requiring a child to take
affirmative steps to enter these sites.
164
3. Renton v Playtime Theaters
In Renton, a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theaters out
of residential neighborhoods was held to be constitutional. 65 The
government argued in Reno that the effect of the CDA was to
create adult "cyberzones"'' 66 in the manner of the city of
'60 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730 (1978). Although the FCC
ultimately never imposed sanctions it did state that it could revoke the license of
the radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation that broadcast the monologue. Id.
161 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
162 Id. See supra Part II.B, discussing the content-based statutory provisions
of the CDA.
163 Id. Another, perhaps less compelling, argument made by Justice Stevens
against the applicability of Pacifica was the fact that the broadcast medium was
historically heavily regulated, and therefore the FCC's order in Pacifica was
consistent with this history. Id. By contrast, added Justice Stevens, the Internet
had no history of regulation. Id.
164 Id. Although the affirmative steps concept discussed in the opinion appear
to contradict the Reno Court's discussion earlier in the opinion of the relative
ease of navigation on the Internet, the Court was merely establishing that
pornographic sites are accessed only be the volitional act of an individual. Id.
165 Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 55 (1986).
166 Brief for the Appellants at 16, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
(No. 96-511). The term "cyberzones," apparently coined by Appellants, and
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Renton. 6 7 Justice Stevens emphasized that, just as in Pacifica,
the Renton ordinance was not a content-based statute.168 The
ordinance sought merely to control the location where adult films
could be watched. 169 By contrast, the CDA was a "content-based
blanket restriction on speech.' 17' Rather than bolster the govern-
ment's argument for the constitutionality of the CDA, Stevens
viewed Renton, Pacifica, and Ginsberg as consistent with the
application of a strict scrutiny review of the CDA's provisions."'
C. The Rationale for Striking Down the CDA's Provisions
The Supreme Court advanced three main reasons why the
provisions of the CDA were unconstitutional. First, the CDA was
unconstitutionally overbroad.'72 Second, the CDA's failure to
distinguish "indecent" from "obscene" material resulted in provi-
sions that did not pass a vagueness challenge.'73 Finally, the
language of the CDA completely ignored the Miller standard for
obscenity. '74
The Supreme Court regarded the breadth of material covered by
the CDA as "wholly unprecedented."' 75 According to the Court,
the CDA was a complete ban of indecent speech that would affect
nonprofit groups, individuals, and commercial organizations.
176
To illustrate, Justice Stevens used the example of the California
adopted by the Supreme Court in Reno, refers to restricted areas on the Internet,
exclusively for adult material, where children would be unable to enter. Id.
167 Id. ("Just as the cities of Detroit and Renton could direct adult theaters
away from residential neighborhoods, so Congress could direct purveyors of
indecent material away from areas of cyberspace that are easily accessible to
children."). Id.
168 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 2343.
172 Id. at 2347. See supra note 90 (discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
113 Id. at 2348. See supra note 90 (discussing the vagueness doctrine).
"' Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2348 (1997). See supra note 24-26 and
accompanying text (discussing the Miller three-part test of obscenity).
175 Id. at 2347.
176 Id.
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Museum of Photography Web site' which would be liable under
the CDA for showing Robert Mapplethorpe's photography of male
nudes to help advertise a touring exhibit of his photography.
78
The CDA's failure to distinguish indecent from obscene material
would therefore have the effect of prohibiting the dissemination of
non-pornographic material and speech of serious educational
value. 1
79
Having determined that the CDA provisions were content
based, 8 ° the Supreme Court reasoned that vagueness in the
statute's terminology would have a chilling effect on free
speech.8 ' Additionally, ambiguities regarding the scope of the
CDA's coverage immediately raised First Amendment con-
cerns. 82 The Court noted that the statute's ambiguous and
inconsistent language would "provoke uncertainty among speakers
about how the two standards relate to each other.' 83 Further-
more, the issue of vagueness was of particular concern to the Court
because the CDA was a criminal statute. 84 The severity of the
177 UCR/California Museum of Photography (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.cmp.ucr.edu/site/museum.html>.
178 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
179 Id. at 2348.
80 See supra note 59 (discussing content-based regulations).
181 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45. For example, the Supreme Court noted that
the CDA used inconsistent linguistic forms which contributes to its vagueness:
For instance, each of the two parts of the CDA uses a different
linguistic form. The first uses the word "indecent," ... while the
second speaks of material that "in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs," ....Given the
absence of a definition of either term, this difference in language will
provoke uncertainty among speakers about how the two standards
relate to each other and just what they mean.
Id. at 2344 (citations and footnotes omitted). See supra note 90 (discussing the
Supreme Court's vagueness doctrine).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 2344-45 (stating that "[t]he severity of criminal sanctions may well
cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful
words, ideas, and images").
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punishment, coupled with ambiguity in the statutory language,
would therefore stifle speech that was only arguably unlawful.1 85
The Court's discussion of the Miller standard 86 addressed the
issue of vagueness and suggested an alternative to the CDA's
constitutional shortcomings. 18 The Reno Court rejected the
government's assertion that the CDA was no less vague than the
obscenity standard in Miller.'88 The Supreme Court noted that the
adoption in section 223(d) of the term "patently offensive"
comprised the second prong of the Miller three-part test, but
disagreed that the CDA and Miller were therefore of equal
specificity.'89 What narrowed the Miller definition of obscenity,
according to the Court, was the combination of all three parts of
the test. 90 Moreover, Miller specifically defined obscenity in
terms of applicable state law,' 9' and reduced the scope of obscene
material to sexual conduct, while the CDA included "excretory
activities"'92  and "organs ' 9'93 of a sexual or excretory na-
ture. 194 Finally, the Miller requirement that the work "lack serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" was conspicuously
absent in the CDA.
95
Ultimately, the CDA failed the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny
analysis because the Act swept too broadly and would have the
effect of suppressing speech which is protected by the First
Amendment. 196 The Court determined that the First Amendment
185 Id.
186 See supra Part IA, discussing the Miller standard of obscenity.
... Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345.
' Id. at 2347.
9 Id. at 2345.
190 Id.
'9' Id. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (discussing the
contemporary community standard). See also Part IA, discussing more generally
the obscenity standard in Miller.
,92 47 U.S.C. § 223 (d).
193 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2345 (citing section 223(d)).
194 47 U.S.C. § 223(d).
'9' Id. See Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
196 Id. at 2350.
239
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
price was too great, even in light of the substantial government
interest in protecting children.97
IV CHAMPION OF FREE SPEECH OR BLUEPRINT FOR SPEECH
REGULATION?
Though most commentators view Justice Stevens' decision as
the final word on regulation of sexually explicit material on the
Internet,"98 the door to significant regulation has been left open.
The Supreme Court's application of strict scrutiny would not be
fatal to amended legislation if the government made a more
convincing argument that no less restrictive alternatives existed to
protect children, in apparent contravention of the Supreme Court's
holding in Butler v. Michigan.'99 The Supreme Court's emphasis
on the failure of the CDA to fully incorporate the obscenity
standard of Miller200 also suggests that amended legislation that
closely adheres to the Miller model would pass constitutional
muster. In the months following the Reno decision, two bills'o°
presented to Congress were arguably tailored to these constitutional
concerns.2" 2 As a result of this legislative activity in the aftermath
of Reno, the recent enactment of the Child Online Protection Act
has ushered in a new era of regulation of the Internet 0 3
"' Id. The Court noted that "[i]n Sable, we remarked that the speech
restriction at issue there amounted to 'bum[ing] the house to roast the pig.' The
CDA, casting a far darker shadow over free speech, threatens to torch a large
segment of the Internet community." Id. (citation omitted).
' See, e.g., Felsenthal & Sandberg, supra note 9, at B1 (discussing how
Reno champions free speech).
'99 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1989). See supra Part IC, discussing the holding in
Butler.
200 Seesupra Part I.A, discussing the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller.
201 This first bill was sponsored by senator Coates and nicknamed the "Son
of CDA." S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1997). The second bill was sponsored by
senator Oxley and was named the "Child Online Protection Act." H.R. 3783,
105th Cong. (1997).
202 See infra Part IV.C, discussing two bills before Congress that sought once
again to amend the CDA in light of the Reno decision.




A. Do "Less Restrictive Alternatives" Exist?
In applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the CDA, the Reno
Court concluded that "[the] burden on adult speech is unacceptable
if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to
serve."2 °4 Conversely, the government would be justified in
suppressing constitutionally protected speech if findings demonstrat-
ed that no less restrictive alternatives existed.2 0 5 In Reno, howev-
er, the Court appeared satisfied with the trial court's finding that
alternative methods existed of protecting children from exposure to
pornography on the Internet.2 °6
The Reno majority squarely supported the argument set forth in
the Appellees' brief that less intrusive alternatives to a complete
ban on cyberporn existed. 27 This argument was based on the
stipulated findings in the trial court2 8 that included the availabili-
ty of parental control software for home computers allowing
parents to limit a child's access to the Internet,20 9 additional
204 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997).
205 Id.
206 Id. at 2336 (citing a lower court finding that "a reasonably effective
method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually
explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their
children will soon be available").
207 Brief forthe Appellee at 36, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No.
96-511). The appellee brief argued:
It is always true that only an 'absolute ban' on adult speech can offer
'certain protection against assault by a determined child'. . . [b]ut the
Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that the First Amendment
rights of adults can be sacrificed to achieve that certainty, especially
when less restrictive alternatives exist.
Id. (citations omitted).
208 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 839 (E.D. Pa 1996).
209 Id. Paragraphs fifty-four through seventy-three of the stipulated findings
of fact discuss user-based software designed to enable parents and other adults
to limit Internet access to children. Id. at 839-42. This software includes Cyber
Patrol, CYBERsitter, The Internet Filter, Net Nanny, Surfwatch, and WebTrack
to name a few. Id. at 839. To help adults screen inappropriate material for their
kids, the World Wide Web Consortium created the "Platform for Internet Content
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filtering of content by the major on-line services,21 the existence
of adult warning pages that precede entry to most pornographic
sites,2" ' and government efforts to educate the public about the
dangers of sexually explicit content on the Internet.
However, the trial court agreed with the government's argument
that parental control software was generally ineffective.2 " The
parties stipulated that this software could screen for suggestive
words or identify sexually explicit sites, but could not identify sites
that had only sexually explicit images without accompanying
text.214 Despite this stipulation, the trial court found that a "rea-
sonably effective" method for screening unwanted content would
"soon be widely available., 2 5 The Supreme Court agreed with
the lower court on this point.21 6 Ultimately, the government was
unable to convince the Supreme Court that these alternative
methods were insufficient to safeguard against children's exposure
to pornography on the Internet.217 The Reno Court concluded that
the government had not met its burden to prove that no less
intrusive alternatives to regulation of the Internet existed."'
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens conceded that, even
assuming parental control software was one hundred percent
Selection" (PICS) which rates content on the Internet and allows parents to pick
and choose what content can be accessed by their home computer. Id. at 838.
210 Id.
21, Id. at 844.
212 Id. at 838.
213 Brief for the Appellant at 40, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
(No. 96-511) (quoting Sen. Grassley, 142 CONG. REC. S706) (emphasizing the
ineffectiveness of parental software on the basis that "it is only partially effective
in screening indecent material and that Congress determined that it would not be
fair for parents to have 'the sole responsibility to spend their hard-earned money
to ensure that cyberporn does not flood into their homes through the personal
computers"').
214 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842.
215 id.
21' Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2336 (1997).
217 Brief for the Appellant at 25, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
(No. 96-511). Appellants unsuccessfully argued that in addition to not being able
technically effective, the parental software was simply not being used by
American families. Id. at 16-17.
2"8 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
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effective in screening sexually explicit content, software still could
not guarantee the shielding of children from harmful material.219
The Court found that parental control software had to be pur-
chased,2 thus discouraging use by parents already skeptical of
its effectiveness. 221 Even if parental control software came
preloaded on every home computer there would be no effective
way of ensuring that all parents would use it.2 22 Some parents
still would allow unrestricted access to the Internet for their
children-with these homes inevitably becoming meeting places for
every curious neighborhood child. 223 Given the likelihood that
many parents would choose not to use computer software to
monitor the content suitable for their children, this method seems
hardly an effective means of promoting the compelling governmen-
tal interest of protecting all children from explicit sexual materi-
al. 224
The appellees argued that most adult sites on the Internet were
preceded by adult warning pages which insured that children could
not inadvertently enter these sites.225 This argument seriously
underestimates the curiosity of adolescent children and disregards
the ease with which the viewer can bypass the warning page with
one click of the mouse. 2 6
219 Id. at 2347.
220 Id. at 2348-49.
221 Id.
222 Id. See also Volokh, supra note 22, at 150 (stating "[f]ilters work only
on those computers on which they are installed and activated, and parents have
little control over the computers used by their children and friends").
223 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 150-15 1. Professor Volokh argues:
So long as even a significant minority of homes in a particular social
circle don't use shielding software-whether intentionally or
carelessly-most kids in the circle will be able to get access to
indecent material. They'll be able fairly quickly to find out who has
the unshielded computer, and then come over to see what they want to
see.
Id.
224 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 151.
225 Brief for the Appellee at 15, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No.
96-511).
226 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 150-151.
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It is unclear why the court appeared satisfied with the mere
promise that future software technology would adequately support
the state's interest in protecting children. 27 If the government
were to make a more compelling showing of the inherent inadequa-
cy of parental control software as a means of keeping Internet
pornography away from children, the Supreme Court might
reluctantly conclude that no less restrictive means exist.
228
B. Amending the CDA using the Miller2 2 9 Standard
The Reno Court's use of Miller v California as a First
Amendment foil to the CDA begs the question of whether the
Supreme Court would have ruled differently on the constitutionality
of the CDA if Congress had adopted wholesale the Miller standard
of obscenity.23° Whether present obscenity standards apply to the
Internet is still an unanswered question. Though Miller is arguably
more specific and targets a narrower class of material, there is still
no bright line distinction between obscene speech, and speech
which is indecent but protected under the First Amendment.
Furthermore, the contemporary community standard is problematic
for the Internet.23 2 Justice Stevens alluded to this problem when
227 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 149 (stating that "the Court is wrong. None
of the Court's proposed alternatives to the CDA-or any other alternatives I
would imagine-would have been as effective as the CDA's more or less total
ban.").
228 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 166. Volokh argues that Justice Stevens'
ruling that the lack of an equally effective alternative to protecting children from
cybersmut could justify a restriction on speech (what Professor Volokh calls the
"pregnant negative") is inconsistent with the holding in Butler which prohibited
a total ban on pornographic material on the basis that the government may not
"reduce the population to reading what is fit for children." See Volokh, supra
note 22, at 166 (citing Butler, 352 U.S. 380, 383). See also supra Part I.C,
discussing Butler. If Professor Volokh is indeed correct in his analysis, then the
fact that Reno quotes this very language from Butler is a true irony.
229 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
230 See supra Part I.A, discussing the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller.
231 See supra Part I.A, discussing the First Amendment distinctions between
obscene and indecent speech.
232 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.) (convicting two
California defendants for transporting obscene computer generated material in
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he pointed out that the Mapplethorpe photographs could be down-
loaded in Baltimore, New York, or Alabama.233
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in the statutory
regulation of the Internet, Justice Stevens stated that "[the] CDA's
burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be
avoided by a more carefully drafted statute., 234 Were Congress
to adopt the Miller three-part test as the definitional basis for an
amended CDA, it would likely pass judicial scrutiny.
235
C. The Legislative Response to Reno: Two Bills and One
New Statute
In the months following the Supreme Court's decision in Reno,
two bills before Congress sought again to amend the CDA by
prohibiting the dissemination of pornographic material on the
Internet. The first bill was sponsored by Senator Coates and was
nicknamed the "Son of CDA., 236 The second bill was sponsored
by Senator Oxley and was referred to as the Child Online Protec-
tion Act237 ("COPA"). COPA was signed into law by President
Clinton on October 22, 1998,"' 8 and, not surprisingly, the ACLU
and a host of other plaintiffs filed suit in District Court in
Pennsylvania challenging the statute's constitutionality.23 9 Both
COPA and the Coates Bill demonstrate a keen awareness by
Congress of many of the constitutional concerns raised by the Reno
Court, and the new Act appears to address some of those issues.
interstate commerce based on the community standard in the receiving state of
Tennessee), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
233 Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2336 (1997).
234 Id. at 2346.
235 Seesupra Part IV.C, discussing two bills presentedto Congress amending
the CDA to conform to the Miller standard.
236 S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1997).
237 H.R. 3783, 105th Cong. (1998).
238 Id. (to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231).
23 See Pamela Mendels, Coalition Files Suit to Block Child Protection Act,
N.Y. CYBERTIMES, Oct. 22, 1998 (visited Nov. 5, 1998) <http://search.nytimes.-
com/search/d.. .+child%7Eonline%7Eprotection%7Eact>.
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1. The Coates Bill.- "Son of CDA"
Less then four months after Reno was decided, Senator Dan
Coates240 presented a new bill in the Senate entitled Prohibition
on Commercial Distribution on the World Wide Web of Material
that is Harmful to Minors ("Coates Bill"), proposing to amend the
Internet provisions of the CDA in light of Justice Stevens' decision
in Reno and the Miller standard.2 4 ' The Coates Bill states, in
pertinent part: "[w]hoever ... through the World Wide Web is
engaged in the business of the commercial distribution of material
that is harmful to minors shall restrict access to such material by
persons under 17 years of age., 242 The Coates Bill defines materi-
al harmful to children as material that, "(i) taken as a whole and
with respect to minors, appeals to the prurient interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion . . .(ii) depicts .. . in a patently offensive way
with respect to what is suitable for minors .. . (iii) lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.,
243
Based on the changes in the proposed amendment, Senator
Coates intended to address four major concerns raised by Justice
Stevens in Reno.2" First, the proposed legislation dealt only with
commercial transactions and thus would avoid the chilling effect on
non-commercial speech.2 45 Second, the prohibition was directed
solely to minors and would not prevent parents from accessing or
purchasing material.2 46 Third, the proposed legislation incorporat-
ed the third prong of the Miller test which requires that the material
have "no social, literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
2 47
Finally, the proposed amendment, by lowering the age of minority
240 Senator Coates is a Republican from Indiana. See generally Thomas:
Legislative Information on the Internet (visited Nov. 29, 1998) <http://thomas.-
loc.gov/home/thomas2.html>.
241 S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1997).
242 Id.
243 id.
244 143 CONG. REC. S12, 146-47 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Coates).
245 Id. at S12,149.




to seventeen, avoided applying the law to persons eighteen years of
age-"those nearest majority" in the words of Justice Stevens.248
In presenting his amendment to the Senate, Senator Coates
underlined two major themes concerning Internet legislation: the
compelling government interest in protecting children from harmful
material on the Internet, 249 and the inadequacy of parental soft-
ware as a tool for promoting that interest.250 The Coates Bill is
a good faith attempt to address the constitutional issues outlined by
Justice Stevens in Reno.25' Accordingly, on July 21, 1998, the
Senate voted in favor of the Coates Bill; however, in light of the
enactment of COPA, resolution of the bill remains undeter-
mined.252
2. Child Online Protection Act
In April 1998, Senator Mike Oxley,253 introduced his own
scaled-back version of the CDA ("Oxley Bill") which prohibits the
commercial distribution of material which is "harmful to mi-
nors."254 On October 21, 1998, as part of the Omnibus
248 Id. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341 (1997).
249 143 CONG. REC. 12,144-01, S 12,149 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement
of Sen. Coates) (stating that the underlying principle of the proposed legislation
is the government's compelling interest in protecting the physical and emotional
health of children).
250 Id. at S 12,147. In addition to asserting that the technology is not reliable,
the Senator vehemently opposed the notion that much of this software is being
developed by the cyberporn industry itself. Senator Coates stated: "There are
millions of dollars being made on the Internet in the pornography business. There
is even more money being made marketing software to terrified parents, software
that doesn't work." Id. at S12,148.
251 S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1997); see generally 143 CONG. REC. 12,144-01
(daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Coates) (discussing each of the Reno
Court's criticisms of the CDA).
252 Matt Smith, Coates Has Busy Senate Day Discussing Issues That Impact
Kids, CONG. PRESS RELEASE, September 11, 1998.
253 Senator Oxley is a Republican from Ohio. See generally Thomas:
Legislative Information on the Internet (visited Nov. 29, 1998)
<http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas2.html>.
254 Child Online Protection Act, H.R. 3783, 105th Cong. (1998). See also
Alan Cohen, Congress Edges Toward Internet Obscenity Ban, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21,
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Appropriations Act, President Clinton signed COPA into law, again
amending provisions of the CDA. 55 In an example of constitu-
tional d~jAt vu, the ACLU and sixteen other plaintiffs filed a
challenge in Federal District Court in Pennsylvania on October 22,
1998.256
The preamble to COPA includes a short list of Congressional
findings which emphasize the ease with which a child can access
the Internet, and the government interest in protecting children
from harmful material on the Internet.257 These findings state in
pertinent part that:
(1) as access to and use of the World Wide Web becomes
ubiquitous, the Web and information transmitted over it
may become more invasive and intrusive in individual and
family lives; (2) children now have greater opportunities
for access to the World Wide Web and such access is
continually expanding; (3) .. .the widespread availability
of computers presents opportunities for minors to access
materials through the World Wide Web in a manner that
can frustrate parental supervision or control; the protection
of the physical and psychological well-being of minors by
shielding them from materials that are harmful to them is
a compelling government interest....258
COPA mandates that any individual who engages "in the
business of selling and transferring, by means of the World Wide
Web, material that is harmful to minors shall restrict access to such
material by persons under seventeen years of age., 259 A convic-
tion under COPA would result in imprisonment for no more than
1998, at 1.
255 Today's News: Update, N.Y.L.J., October 23, 1998, at 1.
256 Press Release, ACLU v. Reno, Round 2: Broad Coalition Files Challenge
to New Federal Net Censorship Law (visited November 5, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/features/fl01698a.html (including as plaintiffs, inter alia,
A Different Light Bookstore, ArtNet, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Free
Speech Media, LLC and the Internet Content Coalition, whose members include
CBS New Media, Time Inc., and the New York Times Electronic Media
Company among others. [hereinafter ACLU Press Release].





six month and/or a fine of up to $50,00.260 COPA provides an
affirmative defense if a defendant restricts access to persons under
seventeen years of age by requiring "a verified credit card, debit
account, adult access code, or adult personal identification
number."26'
This new statute offers a three-pronged definition of material
that is "harmful to minors," which attempts a variation on the
obscenity standard set by Miller v California.62 As defined in
COPA, material "harmful to minors" is material that
(i) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to
a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; (ii) depicts
. .. in a patently offensive way with respect to what is
suitable for minors ... (iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for mi-
nors.
263
In addition to providing a definition of material that is "harmful
to minors,, 264 COPA-in apparent anticipation of a vagueness
challenge-provides that the Federal Communications Commission
will post further definitions of "harmful to minors" on its World
Wide Web site.2 65 The suit brought by the ACLU on behalf of
sixteen plaintiffs will likely assuage those individuals and organiza-
tions who view COPA as constitutionally suspect.266 Not least of
those opposed to the new legislation is the Department of Justice
("DOJ") which expressed "serious concerns" about its constitution-
ality in a letter to Congress. 67 This letter, from the Office of the
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. To compare the COPA "harmful to minors" standard to the obscenity
standard enunciated in Miller see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text
(discussing the Miller three-part test of obscenity).
263 H.R. 3783, 105th Cong. (1998).
264 See supra, note 254 ("appeals to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion ... in a patently offensive way with respect to what is suitable for
minors.").
265 H.R. 3783, 105th Cong.
266 Alan Cohen, Congress Edges Toward Internet Obscenity Ban, N.Y.L.J.,
September 21, 1998 at 1.
267 See ALCU Press Release, supra note 256 (quoting letter from the Justice
Department).
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Assistant Attorney General to the House of Representatives dated
October 5, 1998, raised several issues concerning the constitutional-
ity of COPA.26 8 This letter discusses "numerous ambiguities
concerning the scope of [COPA's] coverage" which might be
problematic on First Amendment grounds.269
Of the list of ten "troubling ambiguities" in the DOJ letter, two
are of particular interest to this note: COPA's articulation of a
compelling interest to protect children and COPA's definition of
material that is "harmful to minors. ' '270
The prohibitions in COPA are explicitly justified based on the
compelling interest to protect the "physical and psychological well-
being of minors by shielding them from materials that are harmful
to them., 27 The DOJ maintains that this interest alone may not
be sufficient to justify the prohibition on speech.272 According to
the DOJ letter, the constitutionality of COPA "would be enhanced
if Congress were to identify as the principal compelling interest the
facilitation for parents' control over their children's upbringing, in
addition to the government's independent interest in keeping certain
materials from minors regardless of their parents' views.,
273
The definition of "harmful to others" was also constitutionally
troubling to the Justice Department. COPA's "harmful as to
minors" appears to mirror the definition provided in Ginsberg,274
while taking into account the Miller standard for obscenity.
However, as the Supreme Court stated in Reno, the statute in
Ginsberg was much narrower in scope than the prohibition in the
former CDA amendments, 275 and arguably narrower than the
268 Letter from L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, to the Honorable Thomas
Bliley, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, US. House of Representatives(Oct.
5, 1998) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 H.R. 3783, 105th Cong. (1998).
272 id.
273 Letter from Sutin, supra note 268 (discussing the constitutional
implications of the Reno opinion).
274 See infra Part III.B. 1, analyzing the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Ginsberg.
275 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341 (1997).
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prohibition in COPA.276 The broader ban on material "harmful to
minors" mandated by COPA, according to the DOJ, is likely to
lead to constitutional challenges based on the statute's vagueness
and overbreadth. 27
Regardless of the outcome of the ACLU suit in the District
Court of Pennsylvania, the flurry of legislative activity surrounding
the Coates and Oxley Bills, culminating in the enactment of COPA,
is the strongest proof yet that Reno is not the definitive word on
Internet regulation.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Reno, while appearing to guarantee a
regulation-free Internet, effectively created a blueprint for future
regulation of cyberspace. The Reno decision suggests that the
application of strict scrutiny in the area of content regulation is not
presumptively fatal to an enacted regulation. Based on Justice
Stevens' version of strict scrutiny, if the government were to make
an adequate showing that no less restrictive means exist to promote
its interest of protecting children from harmful material on the
Internet, regulations like the CDA would actually survive the
Supreme Court's strict scrutiny test.
The recent enactment of the Child Online Protection Act,
amending yet again the CDA provisions relating to the Internet, is
proof that the Reno decision left the door open for legislators eager
to regulate content on the Internet. Now that COPA is being
challenged on constitutional grounds, the government will have
another chance to prove that no less restrictive means exist to fully
protect children from pornography on the Internet. If the govern-
ment meets this challenge, the days of a regulation-free Internet
may soon be over.
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277 Id.

